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INTRODUCTION
The management of demand and capacity is a problem
for hospital emergency departments (EDs) worldwide.1
Inexorable increases in the demand for emergency care
combined with resource pressures place stress on the system.
Crowding caused by a surge in patient numbers, “exit block”
resulting from bottlenecks within hospitals, or difﬁculties
planning discharge can increase the risk of patient safety
incidents.2,3 Indeed, there is increasing evidence that long
waiting times in EDs are associated with negative patient
outcomes, including increased mortality.4,5 Ensuring efﬁcient
ﬂow through the department is therefore a crucial goal for all
managers, administrators, and clinicians for reasons of safety,
resource efﬁciency, and compliance with government targets.5 : November 2017There is a lack of evidence for implementing and
understanding interventions aimed at reducing demand,
managing throughput, and expediting output.6 Input
solutions aim to ﬁlter out “inappropriate users,” but some
question the premise that patients use emergency services
unnecessarily.7 Throughput solutions are dominated by
identifying inefﬁcient processes (eg, triage8,9) and
encourage the introduction of engineering approaches that
help redesign systems (eg, streaming10). Output solutions
aim to reduce delays in discharging patients (eg, the use of
discharge lounges11,12). However, there is a lack of detail
on how throughput and output interventions are adjusted
and adapted in practice to make them work, which leads to
difﬁculties when they are widely implemented.6
In the United Kingdom, National Health Service
(NHS) policy responses to these problems have focused onAnnals of Emergency Medicine 659
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What is already known on this topic
Care delivery organizations commonly develop
“escalation policies” for managing crowding and
surges in emergency department (ED) demand. The
effectiveness of these policies has seldom been
studied.
What questions this study addressed
This study used mixed methods to identify common
patterns in escalation policies in UK EDs and to
evaluate how well they performed in practice.
What this study adds to our knowledge
Formal escalation policies often presumed the
availability of resources that were missing or degraded
when escalation was needed. Consequently, the
actual practice of managing crowding deviated from
that inscribed in policy.
How this is relevant to clinical practice
Recognizing and monitoring the gap between formal
policies and actual practice should help in the
development of more realistic and useful escalation
policies.the introduction of “access targets” and the provision of
extra resources during winter to deal with increased
demand. One target is that patients must be treated and
discharged, or admitted, within 4 hours.13 Hospitals failing
to meet this target for 95% of patients can incur ﬁnancial
penalties, but despite these serious consequences, recent
reports show that each year more hospitals fail to reach this
target, especially during winter.13
Managing patient ﬂow is challenging, and although daily
and weekly peak times can be predicted, unexpected
demands or an unexpected reduction in capacity can occur
at any time. The imposition of waiting-time targets as a
measure of performance creates an additional pressure. In
response, the majority of hospitals in the United Kingdom
now have “escalation” policies. Escalation is the process of
identifying when the department is under increased
pressure and an intensiﬁcation of effort is required to
maintain patient ﬂow. Escalation policies specify thresholds
for action and the responses required. This is the major
codiﬁed organizational response that is designed to enable
EDs to remain resilient against unexpected variability in
demand and capacity, and continue to meet external and
internal targets and standards of care.14 Yet despite the660 Annals of Emergency Medicineubiquity of escalation policies, there has been relatively
little investigation of the actions they contain for aligning
demand and capacity, or of how effectively they work in
practice. Although escalation is a common feature of ED
practices, there have been no studies that we are aware of
that investigate how escalation works in practice.Resilient Health Care
Resilient health care is a coherent set of principles for
understanding how complex adaptive systems such as health
care operate. Resilience can be deﬁned as “the intrinsic
ability of a health care system (a clinic, ward, a hospital, a
country) to adjust its functioning prior to, during, or
following events (changes, disturbances and opportunities),
and thereby sustain required operations under both
expected and unexpected conditions.”15 The core concepts
of resilience direct attention to the importance of studying
how work is carried out in practice because clinical work
does not always ﬁt prespeciﬁed policies and protocols.
Staff manage pressures and problems by making in situ
adaptations and goal trade-offs to achieve good outcomes,
and by studying these processes and learning from how
success is achieved, we can strengthen good practice.
Resilient health care studies have shown that health care
work is characterized by variability and unpredictability,16
and this is especially the case in emergency care. Within the
ED, resilience studies have explored the need for adaptation,
given inherent uncertainty and ambiguity,17 by exploring
processes such as informal patient handovers18 and
managing the risks associated with patient boarding.19
There is little guidance available about how to apply the
concepts of resilient health care in practice. The Concepts
for Applying Resilience Engineering (CARE) model of
resilient health care20,21 was used in this study to guide the
data collection and analysis phases. Brieﬂy, the CARE
model shows that misalignments between demand and
capacity (such as missing equipment, short stafﬁng, and
rapidly deteriorating condition of patients) create the need
for staff to adapt their activities so that positive outcomes
can still be achieved despite the pressures.Goals of This Investigation
The aim of the study was to examine escalation policy in
theory and practice, using resilient health care principles to
identify opportunities for improving the way escalation is
planned and managed. Speciﬁc objectives were to identify
and categorize the types of escalation activities proposed
within a range of formal escalation policy documents;
observe escalation in context to study resilient practice, eg,
whether there was a gap between formal escalation protocolVolume 70, no. 5 : November 2017
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and observed escalation activities to identify wider
implications for service managers and senior clinicians for
policy, system learning, and improvement.MATERIALS AND METHODS
This study is part of a wider project, for which there is
a published protocol,20 that is among the ﬁrst worldwide
to systematically apply principles in resilient health care
for improvement purposes. The study involved 2 phases:
a structured thematic analysis of a range of escalation
policies, and a longitudinal observation of escalation
actions being carried out. Both phases took place in the
United Kingdom’s NHS between May 2014 and
September 2015.
Policies were purposively selected to provide a range of
actions across different organizational conditions. We ﬁrst
identiﬁed EDs of various sizes, using NHS data,22
according to yearly attendance for 2014 to 2015 (large
>150,000, medium 100,000 to 125,000, and small
50,000 to 75,000 patients/year).
Further inclusion criteria were 4-fold: a formal escalation
policy was published and available through the hospital or
NHS Trust Web site; the policy had been updated or
authored within the last 5 years (2010 to 2015); there was a
dedicated policy section for the ED, outlining at least 5
escalation actions; and policy actions had demand triggers
for action (such as patient waiting time or the number of
patients occupying speciﬁc areas of the ED).
Twenty escalation policies were found that matched the
criteria. Eight were excluded from further analysis because
they did not provide speciﬁc detail on escalation actions to
allow extraction and coding of formal responses. The ﬁnal
12 policies were from Imperial College Healthcare,
University Hospitals of Leicester, Brighton and Sussex, and
Guy’s and St Thomas’ (large); Gloucestershire Hospitals,
Norfolk and Norwich University Hospitals, Royal Devon
and Exeter, and South Devon Healthcare (medium); and
Royal Cornwall Hospitals, Royal United Hospital Bath,
Gateshead Health, and East Cheshire (small).Primary Data Analysis
The selected policies were analyzed to identify their
high-level goals (eg, to reduce waiting times, to garner extra
staff) and the types of escalation actions they contained (eg,
to divert ambulance arrivals, to ask on-call physicians to
attend the ED). Similar actions were grouped together
under a general description of the action. This initial
grouping was performed by a researcher (J.B., safety
scientist). Actions were then grouped thematically intoVolume 70, no. 5 : November 2017categories, using a process of aggregation and iterative
testing of the coherence of the categories. This was
performed by the researcher (J.B.), an ED consultant (P.J.),
and an ED service manager. The free-marginal multirater k
calculation23 was used to measure observer agreement for
the categorical data.
The study of escalation in practice drew on a subset of the
data collected during a large study of resilience as a quality
improvement method. For the larger study, data were
collected on all aspects of ED operations. For this study of
escalation, we selected data recording escalation actions.
After analysis of policies, the second phase of the work
involved detailed observations of escalation actions in St
Thomas’ Hospital ED, a large department with more than
150,000 patients attending per year (2014 to 2015). The
hospital is part of Guy’s and St Thomas’ NHS Foundation
Trust, comprising several hospitals, and is a member of one
of the UK’s Academic Health Science Centres.
The observational study was conducted by 2 researchers
(J.B. and M.D.D.) during 16 months (May 2014 to
September 2015). Each observation lasted between 2 and 8
hours, and there were 30 observational episodes (15 per
researcher; 104 hours in total). The study took place
predominantly within the Majors area of the ED, which is
intended for patients with serious illnesses or injuries.
Majors is where the majority of escalation actions are
discussed and coordinated. Staff who consented to the study
were shadowed as they performed their normal duties, with
participants coming into contact with a range of colleagues
during their work. Staff responsible for managing patient
ﬂow and executing escalation actions were purposively
selected to participate, including the physician in charge,
the nurse in charge, and the patient ﬂow coordinator.
Nonparticipant observations24 took place at or close to
the central desk area, where many patient ﬂow
management issues are discussed. The aim was to obtain a
rich description of the patient ﬂow pressures that the ED
was under, and how escalation actions were used to help
address these pressures. Open-ended, informal interviews
were performed during the shadowing process.25
Researcher and participant discussed events and processes
at opportune moments to avoid compromising care or
interfering with escalation actions. This was important
because routine actions might be taken for granted by the
participants25; thus, opportune questions allowed
illumination of the decisionmaking processes involved
when escalation actions were executed.
Times and days for observations were selected to
maximize the chances of there being a busy department
(based on historic occupancy and arrivals data), thus
increasing the likelihood that escalation actions would beAnnals of Emergency Medicine 661
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occupancy levels were at their highest from noon to 2 PM,
with Monday being the busiest day of the week.
Consultants within the department identiﬁed that the shift
handover period 6 PM to 8 PM was when staff experienced
high workload that could affect the management of patient
ﬂow issues. Our observation schedule was designed to
capture these periods, but we also observed at other times
to enable comparisons.
In the tradition of ethnographic studies, our aim was to
capture a deep understanding of the subtleties and nuances
of the culture of the work system. All relevant aspects of the
environment were captured, along with researchers’
questions and thoughts about what was happening.
Researchers used resilience engineering theory to focus on
how workers decided on actions, what actions were
undertaken, and the effect of those actions.
J.B., a safety scientist, and M.D.D., an organizational
psychologist, collected all the data. Extensive ﬁeld notes of
observations, discussions, and personal reﬂections were
made. A pro forma method was designed and used by the 2
researchers (J.B. and M.D.D.) to capture when escalation
actions were proposed, how they were implemented (if
implemented), and any associated outcomes in terms of the
envisaged action. Field notes were transcribed and analyzed
in NVivo (version 10; QSR International Pty Ltd,
Doncaster, Victoria, Australia), using a combined deductive
and inductive thematic analysis. The deductive framework
included concepts from resilience engineering and the
CARE model,20,21 with a focus on adjustments and
adaptations that occurred in relation to escalation actions.
Major themes that were coded were demands, capacities,
misalignments between demand and capacity, adaptations
and outcomes, and the categories used to classify escalation
actions in the policy analysis (see “Results” section).
Actions planned and implemented by staff and outcomes
were analyzed inductively. Emerging insights from the
analysis were discussed extensively with the wider research
team, which included ED clinicians (physicians and
nurses), governance staff, and quality improvement
researchers. Results were also presented and discussed at
ED meetings and resilience health care conferences, and
with nurse colleagues, to test the credibility26 and
trustworthiness of the emerging interpretations.RESULTS
Analysis of Escalation Policies
Escalation policies can be understood in terms of the
resources that EDs need to mobilize and deploy to
maintain acceptable levels of performance and patient662 Annals of Emergency Medicinesafety. Internal escalation actions can be performed with
existing resources within the department, whereas external
escalation actions require resources that are not currently
available within the department and have to be garnered
elsewhere. Table 1 presents the range of internal and
external escalation actions that were found by analyzing the
12 NHS escalation policy documents. Interrater reliability
was considered outstanding23 (k¼0.80; P<.001). A range
of actions was identiﬁed that aimed to reduce demand and
increase both capacity and efﬁciency. The implicit rationale
was that executing these actions would allow patient ﬂow
bottlenecks to be avoided or better managed. Three
high-level goals of escalation policies were thematically
identiﬁed, together with action types to achieve these goals.
First was the goal of increasing capacity to allow more
patients to be assessed or treated. Action types codiﬁed to
achieve this goal were relocating patients who were
occupying areas that did not have capacity to less busy areas
within the ED, additional stafﬁng, and change of
equipment use, including beds, trolleys, and cubicles.
Second was the goal of reducing demand on the ED.
Action types codiﬁed to achieve this goal were relocating
patients to other areas within the hospital (leaving the ED)
and adjusting processes to divert incoming patients to other
hospitals or health care services. Third was the goal of
increasing efﬁciency. Action types codiﬁed to achieve this
goal were adjusting processes to facilitate early
decisionmaking and avoid unnecessary investigations, and
ﬂexing stafﬁng by changing staff roles and responsibilities
within the ED to manage patient ﬂow bottlenecks (for
example, moving a nurse from Majors to front-of-house
assessment).
Table 1 shows the thematic analysis of all codiﬁed
escalation actions (n¼92), categorized by the 3 high-level
goals and by action type. The number in brackets
represents the number of policies in which a speciﬁc action
was proposed.
The conceptual analysis of NHS escalation policies
found that their use requires the ability to dynamically
reconﬁgure resources (staff and equipment), change
normal work ﬂow by adjusting processes, and relocate
patients to other departments or areas within the ED. All
the escalation policies we reviewed were similar in regard
to the detailing of actions involving the ﬂexing of stafﬁng.
The concept of using staff where most needed was
prevalent. Only the larger hospitals detailed processes that
were to be adjusted. The use of relocating patient and
equipment actions was dependent on the size of the ED
ﬂoor and whether short-stay or admission wards were
available for negotiated use. Some escalation policies were
more prescriptive in terms of what demands triggered anVolume 70, no. 5 : November 2017
Table 1. Thematic analysis of codiﬁed escalation actions.
Action Type
Aim
Increase Capacity Reduce Demand Increase Efﬁciency
Relocating patients [4] Move lower-acuity patients who are currently
occupying cubicles or trolleys to seats
[1] Move patients to nonclinical areas
within the ED to free cubicles
[7] Consider direct referrals/fast-tracking of
patients to specialty wards
[6] Maximize use of protocols to stream patients
straight to admitting wards
[4] Move patients on admitting wards to
specialty wards to ease ED exit block
[2] Streaming nurse to turn patients
away (if appropriate)
[2] Specialist areas to organize collection of
patients directly from ED
Adjusting processes or
equipment use
[3] Beds throughout the hospital reviewed
to identify spare capacity
[3] Operational issues explored to identify
reduced capacity, eg, equipment failure
[2] Use Resus and Minors spaces for Majors patients
[1] Empty trolley space to ensure ambulances are ofﬂoaded
[1] Consider converting 4-bed bays to 6-bed
bays within Majors
[1] Compromise on the single-sex principle
for bays will be considered
[1] Compromise on infection control will be
considered for any closed (infected) areas
[4] Ambulance divert to be considered
as a last resort mechanism
[2] Patients should be assessed by specialty
team within 30 min
[2] Staff to use expedited discharge
protocol across ED area
[1] Ensure staff are not requesting inappropriate
investigations (laboratory tests)
[2] Site nurse practitioner to support ED
with patient ﬂow/discharge
[2] Staff to use rapid assessment protocols
to ensure early decisionmaking
[1] Ensure transfer checklist is completed
and only essential tasks undertaken
[1] Ensure that investigations are
ordered for patients who are waiting
Additional stafﬁng or
ﬂexing stafﬁng
[5] Allocate additional patient transfer
staff (nurses and porters)
[4] Additional locum/bank/agency staff to
be requested (physicians and nurses)
[3] Consider using emergency physicians and ED nurses from
administration roles and practice development
[3] External specialty team stafﬁng reviewed
to identify spare capacity
[3] Make additional diagnostic staff available
in laboratories/radiology
[1] Service managers ED and acute medicine
to come to shop ﬂoor to assist
[1] Consultant on call to attend the ED and
consider calling in a second consultant
[1] Additional phleb/IV access capacity
to be deployed to the ED
[1] Consultants to ensure specialist physicians with
decisionmaking capability attend ED
[4] Additional review of patients by specialty to
identify those who may be discharged
[5] Stafﬁng across all ED areas reviewed
to identify underused staff
[3] Emergency physicians and ED nurses redeployed
where this will best improve patient ﬂow
[2] Consider making registrar physician
available to work with rapid assessment team
[2] Site nurse practitioner to support ED
with patient ﬂow/discharge
[1] Consider redeploying staff to coordinate
front-of-house assessments
[1] Consider redeploying staff to coordinate
ambulance handovers
[1] Assign designated treatment nurse in
Urgent Care Center
IV, Intravenous.
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Emergency Department Escalation in Theory and Practice Back et alaction (eg, waiting times, departmental occupancy) than
others.
Although codiﬁed actions were speciﬁed by the policies,
these were devised as a way of behaving in response to a
predicted situation, established before the event, and can be
considered action-oriented rules.27 These types of action
responses have advantages such as saving time and effort in
“reinventing the wheel” in known situations, and aim to
increase capacity, reduce demand, or increase efﬁciency
through predictability in response across staff. However, it
has also been suggested that they may cause blindness to
new situations, may cause resentment at a loss of freedom
(possibly resulting in violations), and place higher demand
on the system for rule supervision.27 Our study of how
escalation works in practice investigated how codiﬁed
actions are implemented.
Observation of Escalation in Practice
The ﬁrst task in observation of escalation in practice and
understanding the landscape of escalation was to
understand the important local context within which ED
escalation takes place in the study hospital (Figure).
Patients arriving by ambulance should be assessed within
15 minutes by the rapid assessment team or be takenFigure. Simpliﬁed model of patient ﬂ
664 Annals of Emergency Medicinedirectly to the resuscitation area (in the case of life-
threatening illnesses or injuries). All other arrivals had to
undergo front-of-house assessment, where they might be
encouraged to visit a general practitioner surgery or
specialist clinic instead. Patients still wishing to be treated
were given a ticket, which started the visit timer, and were
required to register at reception. After registration, patients
waited until a nurse was available for triage. Once triage
was complete, a patient was discharged home or directed to
the urgent care center (low acuity); in some cases a
handover to Majors (where serious illnesses or injuries are
treated) was required. When patients arrive in Majors,
where the majority of those arriving by ambulance are
treated, the aim is to begin treating before the 1-hour
treatment target (patients should begin treatment by a
clinician within 1 hour of arrival). The study hospital had
an Emergency Medical Unit (short-stay ward) in which
patients who required additional diagnostics or treatment
could be sent, distributing workload within the department
and circumventing the 4-hour throughput rule.
Decisions to escalate were discussed at a meeting that
was scheduled every 2 hours and attended by
representatives who managed the different ED areas
(Figure). This primarily occurred between 8 AM and 6 PMow within the study hospital’s ED.
Volume 70, no. 5 : November 2017
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60 of these meetings were observed. Formal escalation
happened when the number of patients within the ED
exceeded planned capacity. We report on examples that
explicate these issues, and identify the prerequisites to
performing the escalation action types identiﬁed in the
policy analysis.
Table 2 summarizes actions that were taken to relocate
patients and reconﬁgure the use of beds to align capacity
with demand with illustrative excerpts from the data. When
the department became busy, the reality of working under
sustained pressure limited the extent to which 4-hour
breaches could be averted. For example, some physicians in
charge devoted their time and attention to patients with the
greatest clinical need, meaning they could not always assist
with patient ﬂow management (observations 25, 27, and
28), even after being requested (observation 15). One
consultant argued that when there is poor skill mix,
physicians are motivated by clinical needs and patient safetyTable 2. Relocating patients: escalation actions.
Escalation Action and Type Example From Observat
Relocating patients by sending
them to another service.
This attempts to reduce
demand.
Occasionally patients were encoura
a general practitioner or attend a
care provider (eg, a sexual healt
of waiting to be treated.
Relocating patients to a less
busy area within the ED.
This attempts to increase
capacity for waiting patients.
There was very limited scope to rel
because of the physical limitatio
Capacity could sometimes be inc
reassigning cubicles in Resus for
undergoing treatment, or creatin
chaired area in Majors where pa
and await test results instead of
cubicles.
A consultant was observed telling a
that although cubicle space was
unsafe to treat a patient in an a
stafﬁng for monitoring (eg, what
the patient unexpectedly deterior
Expediting patient transfers to
other areas in the hospital.
This attempts to increase
efﬁciency of
patient relocation.
Successful expedited transfers requ
maintain an awareness of the st
hospital system so that possible
were identiﬁed in anticipation of
enabled batch referrals, meaning
physicians could review a batch
when in the ED rather than mak
to see individuals, which reduced
The patient ﬂow coordinator was a
helped by integrating data from
of sources, including IT systems
verbal updates from clinical staf
how the department was functio
were preempted by ordering of d
anticipation of need to expedite
Volume 70, no. 5 : November 2017rather than by adhering to the 4-hour access target
(observation 23).
When pressure mounted, there was often a reduction in
communication between team members and increased “silo
working” on the part of the nurse in charge and physician
in charge. These senior clinicians would often become
overburdened, leaving the ﬂow coordinator to cope alone,
further slowing down patient ﬂow. On a number of
occasions, the ﬂow coordinator had to enter “ﬁreﬁghting
mode” and was observed looking for missing diagnostic
results, ﬁnding missing documentation, looking for
specialty referrals, and locating missing members of staff as
a consequence of clinicians not having the capacity to
monitor patient ﬂow (observations 25, 27, and 28).
Critically, there was individual variability in how key
coordinating roles were performed. This affected the ability
of the department to relocate patients. Some physicians in
charge maintained the ability to oversee the department
and proactively monitored junior physicians, asking themional Data Outcome
ged to consult
nother health
h clinic) instead
Conversations were oftentimes
consuming and slowed front-of-house
assessment (Observations 3, 6).
ocate patients
ns of the space.
reased by
Majors patients
g a
tients could sit
occupying
When patient occupancy in the ED
was high, there was invariably
a lack of cubicle space
to assess and treat patients.
The escalation policy suggested
that this could be dealt with
by relocating patients within the
department (Observations 17, 21).
junior physician
available, it would be
rea without adequate
happens if
ates?).
Relocating patients was rarely
straightforward. Reconﬁguring
the space created extra risks if
the area was not fully staffed
(Observation 25).
ired the ability to
ate of the wider
admission pathways
needs. This also
that specialty
of potential patients
ing multiple trips
overall waiting time.
The ability to expedite transfers
during escalation was found
to depend on the effectiveness
of the team working structure
established between the
physician in charge,
nurse in charge, and patient
ﬂow-coordinator roles.
crucial role and
a variety
and
f, to make sense of
ning. Bottlenecks
iagnostic tests in
transfers.
“Exit block” occurred when there
was no bed availability or a
lack of coordination resulted in
the upcoming availability
of beds not being monitored
(Observations 4, 12, 13, 17, 23, 26).
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Emergency Department Escalation in Theory and Practice Back et alfor case presentations to expedite decisionmaking to enable
patients to be relocated (observations 13 and 17). Silo
working was observed when the physician in charge did not
take an overseer role and escalation actions that were
codiﬁed were not implemented (observations 25, 27, and
28). However, this was not exclusively a problem associated
with the physician-in-charge role. For example, the nurse in
charge sometimes helped with the assessment of newly
arrived patients, which increased workload for the patient
ﬂow coordinator when planning patient transfers. An
overburdened ﬂow coordinator was unable to maintain
situation awareness, slowing down patient transfers.
Information availability also greatly limited the ability of
the team to monitor patient ﬂow. Adaptations were rarely
straightforward because of the difﬁculty of monitoring a
patient’s journey through the ED and the uncertainty or
complexity of patient ﬂow. Despite the presence of an
information technology (IT) system that tracks a patient’sTable 3. Additional stafﬁng: escalation actions.
Escalation Action and Type
Example From
Observational Data
Codiﬁed escalation involved reassigning
senior ED clinicians who were
working in nonclinical roles
(desk work) to clinical roles.
This attempts to increase capacity
by using existing known resources.
Occurs relatively frequently an
effective when dealing with
in inﬂow that threatens the
performance of the ED. If th
escalation requires more tha
2 h of additional input, then
effectiveness degrades beca
response is less enthusiasti
Codiﬁed hospital wide escalation where
staff from other areas of the hospital
arrived in the department to assist.
This attempts to increase capacity
by garnering extra staff.
This option, although imagined
mechanism for increasing ca
signiﬁcantly increased the w
for senior staff, who had to
how many staff arrived and
skill level, and perform hand
to incoming staff.
Adjusted codiﬁed hospital-wide
escalations. Often no attempt was
made to increase capacity.
External escalations that attem
garner staff from elsewhere
sometimes not instituted be
of the likelihood of no respo
666 Annals of Emergency Medicinestay in the department, there was no artifact in use (such as
a whiteboard) that could be used to maintain a shared
awareness of patient ﬂow. Awareness was maintained
mostly by the patient ﬂow coordinator, who was located
next to the IT system screen.
Table 3 shows escalation actions involving additional
stafﬁng with illustrative excerpts from the data. Hospital-
wide escalations that attempted to garner staff from
elsewhere were sometimes not instituted because of the
likelihood of no response, or when they did happen, the
intended increase in capacity was compromised by a skill
mix problem. Recovery from skill mix problems required
further action involving ﬂexing stafﬁng within the
department. The most reliable method of obtaining
additional staff involved the use of ED staff working in
nonclinical roles. However, awareness of the need to avoid
fatigue and burnout meant that this response was not relied
on if escalations happened frequently.Outcome
d is
a surge
overall
e
n
use the
c.
Staff lost time to perform other important activities
such as administration, teaching, and developing
quality improvement initiatives, to the detriment of
the department. It was also in addition to their
rostered clinical duties and could contribute to
increased levels of burnout and fatigue, both of
which are recognized issues (Observations 17, 21, 22).
as a
pacity,
orkload
assess
their
overs
In one observed situation, coordinating this process
took approximately 30 min to complete. The nurse
in charge found that 3 of the additional nursing
staff were not able (lack of qualiﬁcations) or willing
(lack of experience) to perform intravenous infusions,
necessitating the reallocation of these incoming
nurses to other ED areas. An experienced nurse
was then seconded from triage (ﬂexing staff) to
perform intravenous infusions in the Majors area
(Observation 9).
Similarly, in 2 other observed situations, extra
workload was created for the physician in charge
because incoming physicians needed handover and
support to understand the work ﬂow before they
could contribute to easing the pressure
(Observations 12, 25).
More often than not, external escalation did not result
in additional physicians being sent from other
departments. Not knowing the response makes the
advanced planning of resources difﬁcult
(Observations 9, 21).
pted to
were
cause
nse.
In the evening, there was likely to be a degraded
response to escalation from specialties, so the
department chose not to formally escalate despite
that triggers were met (Observations 17, 24).
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adjustments to processes in some situations, these were
rarely observed. One reason was that physicians in charge
were observed to be risk averse and prioritized clinical care
over the 4-hour target. One physician in charge instructed
his junior physicians to ignore the 4-hour throughput
target and said that it was “[his] job to worry about that”
(observation 7). This was clearly to take pressure off them
and increase their focus on patient care. Similarly, junior
physicians were observed being encouraged to be thorough
and order the full range of diagnostic tests even when the
department was busy (observation 30). Observations
showed that the escalation policy was sometimes not
invoked even when conditions for escalation were met
(observations 7, 9, and 15). During busy periods of the
year, it was historically deemed important not to call
escalations too frequently because it might result in a
degraded response (“crying wolf”). Recent departmental
policy encouraged escalations when conditions were met,
and a failure to escalate would sometimes result in a
reprimand from service managers, especially when targets
were not met. Hospital management requires the ED to
trigger the escalation policy even when ED staff do not
believe that doing so will be beneﬁcial (observation 30).
In situ interviews revealed that the best way of
identifying opportunities to adjust processes was to
instigate a board round (patient situational review). Board
rounds involved a standing meeting of all the physiciansTable 4. Flexing stafﬁng: escalation actions.
Escalation Action and Type Example From Observati
Flexing stafﬁng so that bottlenecks
may be avoided was a normal
part of managing the variability
in patient ﬂow (this included
the ﬂexing of physicians,
nurses, and administrative
staff). This attempts to
increase efﬁciency.
Staff were ﬂexed before the need
the 2-h situational report meeti
The ability to ﬂex staff in response
however, present problems for e
coordination. During ﬂexing, sta
be contacted easily by colleagu
need to query an aspect of pati
During escalation, ﬂexing happene
and was often informal.
The rapid assessment team physi
work alongside the triage nurse
treatment and discharge of low
that the capacity to assess new
could be increased. This need h
independently of the discussion
Volume 70, no. 5 : November 2017who had patients assigned to them in the Majors area
(all observations). In one observed situation (observation
9), the ED met the occupancy triggers for an external
escalation, but after the board round it was decided that it
should remain at internal escalation. Each physician brieﬂy
reported on whether his or her patients could be expedited
for admission or discharge. This resulted in one third of the
patients’ being identiﬁed as ready to leave the ED, and the
speciﬁed call for further escalation was averted. It logically
follows that if the department is very busy, then there may
be no time for opportunistic board rounds. In one observed
situation (observation 15), the nurse in charge had lost
track of plans made for a number of patients and suggested
to the physician in charge that a board round might help
clarify the situation. However, the physician in charge was
busy managing a complex patient case and was reluctant to
interrupt work ﬂow. The lack of a board round at that time
had a downstream effect on planning, and at least some
4-hour target breaches might have been avoided if a board
round had been held.
Table 4 reports on the ﬂexing stafﬁng escalation action
type with illustrative excerpts from the data. Unfortunately,
ﬂexible stafﬁng was sometimes difﬁcult to coordinate,
leading to a lack of awareness among team members.
Actions that were responsive adaptations had consequences
that also needed to be anticipated; consideration and
ownership of associated risks involved in these adaptations
were important. Furthermore, when a staff member hadonal Data Outcome
was raised at
ng.
This enabled the department to
quickly respond to pressures
(Observations 16, 26).
to needs does,
ffective team
ff often cannot
es who may
ent care.
Time wasted locating colleagues, missing
notes, and blood samples
(Observations 12, 16, 17).
d more frequently In one case, a Resus consultant who was
ﬂexed to Majors left after reviewing a
patient, and a nurse was then unable to
locate the consultant to query an
outstanding issue (Observation 27).
cian decided to
s to expedite the
-acuity patients so
ly arrived patients
ad been identiﬁed
s of escalation.
Although this decision to help in triage was
indeed made in coordination with
the nurse in charge, the physician was
busy with other duties when an ambulance
patient handover was required; no one
else in the team knew where the physician
was and the handover was delayed
(Observation 12).
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the system monitored or assessed? When was it time to
switch the staff member back to his or her original role?
There were no mechanisms in place to help with this type
of planning.
Although the escalation policy speciﬁed the patient
numbers that should trigger an escalation, in practice,
skilled practitioners used their expertise to decide when
escalation was necessary. Escalation decisions were made at
patient ﬂow meetings held every 2 hours and attended by
representatives managing the different ED areas, depicted
in the Figure. During patient ﬂow meetings, other informal
responses to the buildup of patients at crucial waiting areas
in the department were decided on and implemented.
Codiﬁed escalation was rarely discussed and avoided if at all
possible.
Invoking escalation often created additional demands at
the very time demand was highest and threatened to
overwhelm the department’s capacity to maintain patient
ﬂow. Extra demands were created by the need to plan the
escalation, prioritize needed actions, coordinate handover
to incoming and reassigned staff, and assess the skills of
staff and match these to the areas of need. Many actions
were “shop-ﬂoor actions” and were successful because
escalation is experience based and case reasoned rather than
an easily codiﬁed process. Without the ability of the system
to perform adjusted shop-ﬂoor actions, there would be few
successful escalation actions. Furthermore, judging the
right time to escalate was difﬁcult; staff wanted to avoid
unnecessary escalation but needed to take action before it
was too late for escalation to be effective. Learning this skill
was challenging, and getting it wrong was highly visible
throughout the hospital and had serious consequences for
the department.
LIMITATIONS
This qualitative study used longitudinal independent
observations of escalations across a range of ED locations
and functions. In line with quality criteria for qualitative
studies,28 we identiﬁed a well-deﬁned research question,
clearly described our data collection and analysis methods,
and ensured that coding and interpretation of data were
discussed within the research team and that coding
reliability was tested as appropriate. We used data extracts
to illustrate our conclusions and identiﬁed implications for
health care organizations. However, the study was
conducted in a single organization, and although this
enabled us to capture and understand the subtle and
nuanced everyday work of patient ﬂow management,
further studies could investigate how many of these actions
may be speciﬁc to organizations of a similar type (eg, large668 Annals of Emergency Medicinesite, teaching hospital). The escalation policies that we
studied were broadly similar across a range of organizations,
and this suggests that the types of adaptations we observed
might also be found in other organizations. The
classiﬁcation systems and models we used in this study
could be further tested in other studies and used as a
resource for individuals interested in further study in this
dynamic area. The broader policy analysis covered a range
of institutions, and we are conﬁdent we have captured
broadly the types of escalation actions that are planned,
their general goals, and which are the most frequently
codiﬁed.
DISCUSSION
This study, following a published protocol based on
resilient health care theory, involved extracting and
classifying escalation actions for EDs found in policy, and
observing actual escalations longitudinally in practice. We
have described how formal attempts to specify what to do
when demand increases or capacity is reduced do not
capture the full extent to which the observed ED system
adapts to variable and sometimes unexpected demands, and
that speciﬁc actions may have positive and negative effects,
depending on context. We found many examples of
successful adaptations implemented by staff when the ED
was under pressure, including pre-empting the need for
escalation, using efﬁcient practices such as board rounds to
expedite ﬂow, and ﬂexing stafﬁng to areas within the
department under pressure.
Findings from this study have highlighted that the
common codiﬁed actions discussed below require in situ
adaptation to be successful.
When patients were relocated, the ability to expedite
transfers during escalation was found to depend on the
effectiveness of the team working structure established
between the physician in charge, nurse in charge, and
patient ﬂow-coordinator roles. Successful adaptations
required the ability to maintain an awareness of the state of
the wider hospital system so that possible admission
pathways were identiﬁed in anticipation of needs, and
batch referrals to specialty services could be planned to
reduce waiting times.
When extra staff are garnered in an attempt to increase
capacity, adaptations and adjustments are required to keep
the system functioning while new staff are inducted and
tasks are handed over. External escalation could lead to
emergent effects that were the opposite of those intended
(such as increased workload rather than increased capacity);
knowledge of internal stafﬁng resources tends to be higher
than that of external stafﬁng resources, which need to be
managed with care. Recovery from skill mix problemsVolume 70, no. 5 : November 2017
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resources within the department.
When processes were adjusted, successfully expedited
patient journeys were reliant on getting the delicate balance
between continuing with clinical work and interrupting
work ﬂow to perform planning activities right. Being
sensitive to these pressures highlighted the need for
awareness based on experience and expertise to avoid
initiating unnecessary escalations based on codiﬁed
indicators alone.
When stafﬁng was ﬂexed, the ability to anticipate
bottlenecks and prioritize actions accordingly was necessary
for successful outcomes such as safely managing patient
ﬂow and staff workload. However, actions that were
responsive adaptations had consequences that also needed
to be anticipated, such as communication breakdowns
caused by information not being disseminated by a
member of staff who had been ﬂexed elsewhere.
When the ED is under pressure, normal processes are
adapted to manage pressures informally and dynamically.
This adaptive capacity (work as done) was found to be
incompletely speciﬁed in policies (work as imagined).
Escalation actions, although enshrined in policy
documents, are adapted in practice to maximize patient
ﬂow and avoid potential negative adverse effects of
escalating. Unlike the imagined action-orientated policy
responses, in practice adaptations were more goal
oriented.27 These responses allowed autonomous behavior
(eg, toward the goal of efﬁcient throughput) without
specifying how such goals should be achieved. At times the
escalation policy was triggered without any expectation that
it would help. Such policies serve multiple purposes,
including satisfying hospital reporting requirements and
documenting pressure on the system.
There are a number of implications of the work that we
think are useful take-home messages for ED managers and
clinicians to consider.
Successful adaptations to policy to achieve key
efﬁciency goals have been observed here in situ, but are
not fully speciﬁed in policy. Learning from these
adjustments is unlikely because investigation and
reporting usually takes place only when performance is
suboptimal. This is a generic problem in health care29; we
react to problems rather than learning what is working
well and why. Although individual staff and colleagues
may of course learn from observing others, systematic
organizational-level learning about adaptive capacity in
the system is often lacking. This is important because
without routine study of what constitutes successful
adaptation, it may be simply assumed the policy is the
important driver (see below), which is not what ourVolume 70, no. 5 : November 2017evidence suggests, and the ability to respond to pressures
may not be optimal.
Internal performance reports should be encouraged to
include informal adaptations undertaken to make the
system work under pressure, as well as what these were in
response to (eg, surges in attendance or high acuity, stafﬁng
shortages, equipment failures, bed availability). This
matching of diagnosis and response can give a fuller picture
of the “pathways to success” available to managers, some of
which may be less than fully understood.30 Much insight
can be gained organizationally from the extent to which
clinicians have developed their own adaptive strategies to
manage patient ﬂow. Analysis of the relative merits of the
opportunistic versus the codiﬁed (eg, for board rounds)
might help improve efﬁciency.
The main policy implication is that there should be
mindful recognition and consideration of the fact that
formal policies do not always match the situations that staff
need to respond to; there will always be local contingencies
that have to be taken into account in situ. Failure to
recognize this could lead to the creation of “secret” policies
that reﬂect the real way to achieve things.18 The
development of underground practices can erode the ability
of teams to share and discuss the learning from them, or to
reﬂect on any inherent risks. Understanding the gap
between work as imagined and work as done is crucial for
improvement efforts, which could involve better alignment
between policy and practice, or explicitly supporting in situ
adaptations made by teams with expertise in patient ﬂow.
Real-world escalation is fundamentally about trading off
efﬁciency and thoroughness goals.16 Thus, responses to
strategies used should be less about whether they were
procedural (action oriented) and more about whether they
were able to achieve goals while preserving the common
conventions of safe, quality patient care.
Kreindler31 argued that EDs struggle to achieve
anything more than small-scale localized gains when
attempting to improve patient ﬂow, outlining common
design ﬂaws. Furthermore, a lack of evidence on how
throughput and output interventions work in practice is
said to lead to difﬁculties in implementation.6 Our
approach to studying what happens in practice provides a
basis for understanding the opportunities for improvement
and the barriers to more efﬁcient working.
CONCLUSIONS
It is now recognized that health care systems are complex
and dynamic and interventions often have multiple
components and mechanisms.32 Developing and evaluating
interventions thus requires theorizing to inform
intervention design and modeling of mechanisms andAnnals of Emergency Medicine 669
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was explicitly carried out as a preliminary stage toward
codesigning an intervention with hospital partners. Our
ﬁndings support the view that interventions are unlikely to
succeed (or be meaningfully appraised) without at least
some understanding of likely barriers and facilitators to
improvement. Furthermore, interventions that support the
natural capacity in the system for ﬂexible response to goals,
as observed here, should be considered alongside the
traditional model whereby interventions attempt to specify
standard working (for example, through education and
training).34
Escalation policies outline actions that aim to manage
high levels of workload. They do not explicitly outline the
prerequisite conditions that are needed to enable a
successful escalation. Our ﬁndings suggest that escalation
actions require careful review to ensure that they are
helping to manage workload. Work as done is not
completely speciﬁed by policies. Indeed, it could be argued
that the ability of the ED to make adaptations in situ is
critical for patient safety. However, we need to better
understand why some adaptations lead to desirable
outcomes and others result in failure. Thus, for successful
intervention it is critical to capture what adaptations are
made, rather than assuming it is the policies that enabled
the workload to be managed well or poorly.
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